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Abstract 
 
With the increasing integration of heat and mass and the complexity of process systems, 
process variables are becoming strongly interdependent. Ignoring these dependencies in 
process safety modelling is unreasonable. The present work addresses this dependency 
challenge. It proposes two simple yet robust risk models for process safety analysis.  
The first model is the copula-based bow-tie (CBBT) model, which revises the traditional bow-
tie (BT) model by considering dependencies among the causes and failures of safety barriers. 
Copulas are used to simulate hypothetical dependent joint probability densities. The proposed 
model, along with classical BT analysis, is examined under a case study of the risk analysis of 
a typical distillation column. Comparing the results from both approaches in terms of the 
estimated probability of a potential hexane release scenario, it is shown that the dependencies 
of process units’ malfunctions can increase the likelihood of accident scenarios to a significant 
extent. Further, to explore the mechanisms behind the impact of such dependencies, the effect 
of dependencies on the two most basic logic gates is also analyzed. 
The next model developed is the copula-based Bayesian network (CBBN), which integrates 
linear dependence modelled by a Bayesian network (BN) and non-linear dependence by 
copulas. It provides more reliable estimation of accident probability when applied to real cases. 
Sensitivity analysis identifies the factors that play important roles in causing an accident. A 
diagnostic analysis is also performed to find the most probable explanation for the occurred 
event. Results match the accident investigation report and thus prove the effectiveness of the 
proposed model. 
Key words: Risk assessment; Bow-tie; Bayesian network; Dependence; Copula; Process safety; 
Accident model   
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Overview 
 
Complex process operations involving large inventories of hazardous materials have 
serious safety concerns. The loss of material in such facilities may lead to low-probability 
but high-consequence events (Pasman, 2015), such as significant economic loss, 
environmental damage or multiple fatalities or injuries. These concerns are quantified in 
terms of financial and personnel risk. Past major accidents, for example, Bhopal (1984), 
Piper Alpha (1988) and Buncefield (2005), have led to the establishment of process safety 
management regulations. While process safety management is effective, its full potential 
has not yet been reached. Also, as the complexity of operations is on the rise, accident 
causation is becoming more complex and harder to estimate and predict (Vaughen and 
Kletz, 2012). This situation underscores the need for better estimation of these accident 
scenarios, their likelihood, quantitative risk and subsequently better safety management 
practices, and many qualitative and quantitative analysis methods have been developed to 
meet this need.  
 
 Quantitative Risk Analysis  
 
In the past, qualitative analysis was widely used for the risk assessment of hazardous 
substances. However, one of its obvious drawbacks is its vagueness in terminology, such 
as the description “a high degree of protection” (Buncefield Major Investigation Board, 
2008). On the other hand, Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) is easy to perform and is now 
widely applied because the computational burden has been lessened thanks to technological 
progress.   
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QRA was first used in nuclear plants. In the 1970s, the probabilistic risk assessment for the 
nuclear sector was developed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It was 
only at a later stage that QRA was applied to chemical process safety management. In 2012, 
Seveso, the European industrial safety regulatory agency, issued its third generation of 
safety regulations (Seveso III directive) (EU, 2012), which apply to more than 10,000 
industrial establishments, many of which are chemical plants (European Commission - 
Environment Directorate, 2015). As a widely-used approach, QRA has been adopted to 
facilitate the implementation of Seveso regulations (Pasman and Reniers, 2014).  
The latest trend in the development in QRA has been towards dynamic risk analysis (Villa 
et al., 2016). Dynamic QRA makes use of newly available information on the process 
system such as accident precursors or alarm databases to continuously update the risk level. 
The steps involved in dynamic QRA are shown in Fig. 1.1. From this comprehensive 
perspective, dynamic QRA is considered a robust tool for hazard and risk quantification of 
a process facility. 
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Identify hazards and accident scenarios
Derive risk level
Estimate frequency Estimate consequence
Choose a process syetem
Evaluate whether risk is accpetable
New information 
available
Yes
No
 
Figure 1.1 QRA steps adapted from Hashemi (2016). 
 
Hazard and accident scenario identification is the very first step in the QRA technique, 
which involves a thorough review of potential abnormal situations, such as high 
temperature, overpressure, leakage, etc. These abnormal situations can escalate to 
accidents if related protection and mitigation systems fail. According to the CCPS (2001), 
the protection layers for process plants can be classified as belonging to the following 
categories: the process design itself, basic process control systems (BPCS), alarms and 
operator actions, safety instrumented functions (SIF), and relief valves along with an 
automatic shutdown system in cases of emergencies. In general, not all these safety and 
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control systems are applied. The number of incorporated safety systems depends on the 
risk acceptance criteria required by the regulating authorities. 
As is reported by CCPS (2003), there are many methods available for the hazard 
identification of a process system: Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis (FMEA), safety checklists, etc. To limit the focus to severe hazards or 
credible scenarios, one may employ the maximum credible accident scenario analysis 
approach proposed by Khan and Abbasi (2002).  
The next risk analysis steps refer to the estimation of frequencies of identified accidents 
and their potential consequences. This estimation can be carried out by means of 
probabilistic and engineering models (Crowl and Louvar, 2011).   
Frequency estimation calls for the collection of failure rates or probabilities of failure in 
demand data. Such generic data are usually based on expert judgement and process 
empirical knowledge and can be collected from databases such as OREDA (2002), TNO 
(2005a), HSE (2009), etc. If available, plant-specific data from historical records is the best 
source to be integrated into the calculations. Even though such probabilistic estimation 
cannot fully reflect reality, it still offers meaningful and detailed predictions of potential 
risks. 
Consequence estimation involves the determination of possible effects in terms of health 
loss, property loss and environmental damage resulting from undesired scenarios. There 
are many mathematical and empirical models available for the estimation of consequences. 
Interested readers may refer to Crowl and Louvar (2011) and Assael and Kakosimos (2010) 
for an exhaustive description of source models, fires, explosions and toxic gas dispersion 
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calculations. In addition, Yang et al. (2018) used computational fluid dynamics to simulate 
fire in a floating liquefied natural gas facility. As an alternative, Hashemi et al. (2014) 
developed loss functions for the overall consequence assessment of process deviations 
modelling five major loss categories: quality, production, asset, human health and 
environmental losses. 
The risk level is established once the estimation results of frequency and consequence are 
determined. If new information on the behavior of the process system becomes available, 
new hazards may be identified, and the present risk level should be revised by estimating 
the frequency and consequence again. This updated risk profile is then compared with the 
acceptability criteria to confirm if it meets the requirements. 
 
 Specific QRA approaches 
 
While the previous section contributes to the overview of QRA, the current section 
introduces the most common approaches to performing QRA, especially for hazard 
identification and frequency estimation procedures.  
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a typical graphical QRA tool. When performing FTA, the top 
event, usually the release of hazardous materials from a container, is identified first. Next, 
all the possible intermediate and basic events such as the occurrence of abnormal 
conditions and the subsequently unfortunate failures of protection systems are found by 
conducting a causal analysis. The top event probability can then be obtained from the 
logistics shown in the developed fault tree. 
Similar to FTA, event tree analysis (ETA) is also an easily-adopted risk assessment method. 
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ETA consists of many branches, which start from an unwanted event, normally known as 
the top event, and end with different outcomes. The outcomes will differ based on the 
performance of safety barriers that are supposed to reduce the effects of the top event.  
Combining FTA and ETA will lead to the bow-tie (BT) diagram, which is considered a 
comprehensive QRA technique, since it presents both the causes and the consequences of 
a top event. Some recent adoptions of BT in chemical process safety analysis can be found 
in Aqlan and Mustafa Ali (2014) and Lu et al. (2015).  
Among the most recently used QRA techniques is Bayesian network (BN). BN is defined 
as a directed acyclic graph based on Bayes’ theorem (Mittnik and Starobinskaya, 2010). 
One of the features of BN is its capabilities in updating prior beliefs when new information 
becomes available. In the field of chemical process application, the accident precursor data 
collected throughout the lifecycle of a plant can be used to dynamically adapt the failure 
probabilities of the safety barriers. Based on this, a real-time risk monitoring platform is 
built, which is very useful in supervising the fast-changing operation conditions of a plant.  
 
 Dependency in risk assessment of process systems 
 
When conducting traditional process safety and risk analysis, it is often assumed that there 
is no dependency in the causations. Nevertheless, such an assumption is no longer 
convincing due to process integration. Taking a complex chemical plant as an example, the 
components within the same system, e.g., a temperature safety instrumented system, or 
across systems work under similar circumstances and thus are subject to similar 
temperature, pressure and stress. This leads to correlated failure probabilities of these 
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components. The simultaneous occurrence of several failures caused by inherent 
dependency can result in major accidents or even catastrophes. To prevent these, 
investigation of the potential correlation and dependency among process variables is  
necessary. Unfortunately, research on dependency is very limited in the process safety 
literature. 
BN is one of the few tools available to integrate the consideration of dependency into the 
process of risk assessment. In BN, joint densities are defined using conditional probability 
tables (CPTs). A typical application of BN for modelling dependency can be found in an 
interesting study by Khakzad et al. (2013), where the failure probability of an alarm system 
was assumed to depend on whether the ignition barrier works or not. Similar work has also 
been presented in Ale et al. (2014) and Pasman and Rogers (2013).  Even though the use 
of CPTs to represent simple dependency among variables is straightforward, the BN model 
is unable to construct complex, non-linear dependence (Mohseni Ahooyi et al., 2014). 
Alternatively, as reported in Hashemi et al. (2015a), the correlation coefficient is the most 
widely applied tool to measure complex dependency, with the linear correlation parameter 
or Pearson correlation parameter used for capturing linear relationships and rank 
correlation coefficients for non-linear relationships. However, this single number fails to 
reflect more complicated dependencies (Schirmacher and Schirmacher, 2008). 
To address this shortcoming, copula functions are introduced, which provide a framework 
for the construction of dependent multivariate distributions. Using copulas provides 
increased flexibility, as the variables can come from any marginal family (Nelson, 2006). 
It is notable that by using copulas, the estimation of marginal distributions can be separate 
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from the estimation of dependence structures. 
The use of copula is not foreign in areas such as financial risk management; the risk 
assessment of nuclear plants, see Yi and Bier (1998) for instance; and transportation 
research. However, it was not until the last decade that risk practitioners began to notice 
the potential prevailing function of copula for process safety analysis. Meel and Seider 
(2006) performed a state-of-the-art dynamic failure assessment of an exothermic CSTR. 
An event tree was developed, and copula functions were used to model the dependency 
among the performances of the safety barriers. Pariyani et al. (2012) focused on the effect 
of dependence on the failure probabilities of the safety, quality and operability systems 
with the help of two types of copula families: the Gaussian copula and the Cuadras & 
Auges copula.   
More recent work on the assessment of correlated process variables can be found in Oktem 
et al. (2013), Hashemi et al. (2015b), Yu et al. (2015) and Song et al. (2016). It is worth 
mentioning that in Hashemi et al. (2015b), copulas were employed to construct a 
multivariate loss function for the modelling of operation loss in a hypothetical de-ethanizer 
column. However, the research focus was on the overall risk estimation while considering 
the dependence between operational risk and business risk. 
 
 Research scope and objective 
 
The scope of the thesis covers the estimation of accidents’ likelihood while considering 
dependencies in risk analysis. The research also studies the mechanisms behind such 
effects of dependencies. The developed models are especially applicable to complex 
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process systems. 
From previous subsections of the overview on the QRA technique and its popular forms 
and applications in process safety analysis, it can be concluded that the accurate modelling 
of correlation in risk assessment remains an unresolved challenge. Therefore, the overall 
objective of current research is the application of copula functions to fill this gap. Copula 
functions are incorporated in existing QRA techniques to build two novel risk assessment 
models: 
ⅰ) Copula-based bow-tie model (CBBT) 
ⅱ) Copula-based Bayesian network (CBBN) 
The first objective of this research is the development of the copula-based bow-tie model 
(CBBT), which considers dependencies in initiating events as well as safety systems. As is 
observed, previous published works about the application of copulas focused on 
dependence in event trees. As a result, only AND dependence has been studied due to the 
inherent attributes of an event tree. To overcome this limitation, the combination of fault 
tree and event tree incorporated in a bow-tie model with copulas, namely CBBT, is 
proposed in the present research.  
With the growing popularity of the use of topological network-based approaches such as 
Bayesian network in risk assessment, the possibility of integrating them with copulas is 
becoming a subject of growing interest for researchers. This leads to the second objective 
of this thesis: the development of a Copula-based Bayesian network (CBBN).  
 
 Novelty and contributions 
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This thesis presents useful methodologies which are innovative and scientifically viable to 
be applied to industry. It contributes to both research academia and industrial 
implementation.  
The proposed CBBT model enables research on the effects of dependency among causation 
factors on not only the AND logic but the OR logic as well. In the developed revised bow-
tie model for a hexane distillation unit, for instance, some correlated initiating events are 
under an AND gate, while others are under an OR gate. The other advantage of 
incorporating both FT and ET is that the root causes of an accident scenario can be fully 
analyzed.   
The second work on the CBBN model successfully preserves the features of both BN and 
copula, with the former capturing conditional dependencies, while the latter modelling non-
linear dependencies, among network nodes. 
Even though copula is a confirmed robust tool for modelling dependency and               
correlation, it has not yet been universally applied in process industries, partly because of 
its abstract and overcomplicated appearance as presented in textbooks. To make copula 
easy to access, another important contribution of this work is the exploration of a simple 
and understandable way to use copula such that it can be added to current risk analysis 
tools without significant efforts or technical difficulties. 
 
 Thesis structure 
 
This thesis is written in a manuscript format, which includes two peer-reviewed journal 
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articles. The outlines of the following chapters are summarized as follows. 
Chapter 2 presents a manuscript published in the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries. It proposes a revised bow-tie model that considers dependency with the help of 
copulas. To highlight the effect of dependence, the methodology is first applied to two 
studies on two common logic gates (AND gates & OR gates). It is then followed by a case 
study on the frequency estimation of the consequences resulting from a potential accident 
scenario of hexane release from a typical distillation column. The simulated consequence 
probabilities from both revised and traditional models are compared. Finally, a detailed 
discussion and explanation of the results is given. 
Chapter 3 contains a manuscript submitted in revised form to Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection. It provides a novel copula-based Bayesian network model. A 
step-by-step description of how to construct it is presented with a demonstrative example. 
To validate the robustness of the proposed risk analysis model, a real-life catastrophe that 
happened in the U.S. is re-examined. A sensitivity analysis for this case is also conducted, 
identifying the most important factors. Further, to take advantage of Bayesian network, 
backward probability updating is performed to find the dominant causes of this accident. 
Chapter 4 summarizes the conclusions of the present research. Directions for future work 
are also suggested. 
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Chapter 2. Risk assessment of process system considering 
dependencies1 
 
Abstract 
Risk assessment is conducted in process systems to identify potential accident scenarios 
and estimate their likelihood and associated consequences. The bow-tie (BT) technique is 
most frequently used to conduct the risk assessment. It is a simple, comprehensive and 
straightforward technique; however, it considers independence among the causation factors 
(initiating events) of an accident scenario and the safety barriers in place to minimize the 
impact of the accident scenario. This is a serious limitation and can lead to erroneous results. 
This paper presents a simple yet robust approach to revise the Bow-tie technique 
considering interdependence. It employs copula functions to model the joint probability 
distributions of causations in the BT model of the accident scenario. This paper also 
analyzes the impact of dependence on two common logic gates used to represent the 
potential accident scenario. The probability of a potential accident scenario in a hexane 
distillation unit using both the traditional BT technique and the revised approach is 
compared. Results confirm that the revised approach is reliable and robust.  
Key words: Risk assessment; Bow-tie model; Dependence; Copula function, operational 
risk  
                                                     
1 C.Guo et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 55 (2018) 204-212. 
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 Introduction 
 
In chemical process industries, it is very likely for accident scenarios to occur. If safety and 
protection systems fail to function, these scenarios will likely escalate into catastrophic 
events. Therefore, it is essential to analyze the risks of existing process systems to increase 
awareness of accident probabilities and their possible consequences. 
To identify hazards and prevent accidents, quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is one of the 
most widely adopted approaches (Khan et al., 2002,Khan and Haddara, 2004). The bow- 
tie model (BT) is a popular and traditional QRA method that contributes to risk 
identification and safety maintenance in process systems. However, BT is often used with 
the assumption that there is no dependence among the causes. While this simplifies the risk 
analysis process, it also decreases the accuracy of the risk estimation, since there may be 
interactions among causes or safety systems.      
As the interrelationships among causations are drawing more attention, there are some 
studies assessing the correlated random variables that lead to abnormal conditions in 
process facilities (Hashemi et al., 2015,Yu et al., 2015). There have also been some tools 
to incorporate dependencies in risk assessment. For example, Bayesian Network (BN) 
analysis defines a joint density by means of conditional probability distributions. Khakzad 
et al. (2013) mapped the BT into the BN, where the dependence of safety barriers on the 
top event is captured. However, BN analysis has the disadvantage of not being able to 
construct non-linear dependence structure (Mohseni Ahooyi et al., 2014).  
To overcome the limitations of these risk analysis methods, Yi and Bier (1998) devised a 
model that uses copula theory (Nelsen, 2006) to capture the dependence between failure 
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probabilities of safety barriers in a nuclear plant. Initially, the application of copulas was 
popular in financial analysis (Durante, F. and Sempi, C., 2015). Recently, copulas are 
starting to be employed in the field of risk assessment of process systems (Pariyani et al., 
2012,Oktem et al., 2013). The major strength of using copulas is that the process of 
estimating marginal distributions is separate from the dependence structure estimation. 
This indicates that the margins of correlated variables can even come from different 
families. 
In Yi and Bier’s model, copula functions were applied to study the dependence in event 
tree analysis. Meel and Seider (2006) then built four Bayesian models to conduct dynamic 
failure assessment by applying this approach to an exothermic chemical reactor. Elidan 
(2010) proposed the Copula Bayesian Network (CBN), which was a combination of BN 
and copula functions. The CBN offered a framework for capturing cause-effect 
relationships among correlated variables with complicated dependence. Hashemi et al. 
(2016) developed a methodology for mapping the BN into the CBN model and the CBN 
structure learning that involves the selection of local copulas and associated parameters.  
The objective of the present work is to develop a robust risk assessment method that 
considers dependence among causations factors and safety barriers. The dependence 
assumption is based on the nature that the components within the same system (i.e. 
temperature safety instrumented system etc.) or across systems of a chemical plant work 
under similar circumstances and thus are subject to similar temperature, pressure or stress. 
This leads to correlated failure probabilities of such components. The work considers 
dependence in both the event tree and the fault tree parts of the bow-tie. To highlight the 
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importance of considering dependence in risk analysis, the present study also compares the 
results of the consequence probabilities from the proposed methodology with the results 
from a conventional BT model where the dependence effect is ignored. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, the proposed updated 
risk assessment methodology with two illustrative examples is provided. This proposed 
methodology is then applied to a case study involving a distillation unit in Section 2.3. 
Section 2.4 briefly discusses the effect of dependence by analyzing the results, followed 
by some conclusions as presented in Section 2.5.  
 
 The proposed risk assessment methodology  
 
The proposed methodology considers dependence among the causations for risk 
assessment. This methodology is the revised version of the bow-tie technique. The details 
of this methodology are presented in Figure 2.1. To better illustrate the methodology 
(shown in Figure 2.1), two simple examples are presented here. These examples study the 
effects of dependence of common logic gates (AND/OR).  
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Step 1: Identify accident scenario
Consider a process system
Step 5: Estimate the probability of major OEs 
Step 2: Develop bow-tie model
Step 3: Derive occurrence probabilities of initiating events 
(IEs) and failure probabilities of safety barriers (SBs)
Step 4: Estimate top event (TE) and outcome events (OEs) 
probabilities considering interdependence of IEs and SBs 
 
Figure 2.1 Methodology for risk assessment considering dependence. 
  
  Step 1: Identify accident scenario 
 
Once a process system is selected, the probable accident scenario is developed. 
Subsequently, the causes of this accident scenario or top event (TE), which are called 
initiating events (IEs) in bow-tie analysis, are identified. The accident scenario is then 
further analyzed based on the failure or success of safety barriers (SBs), leading to the 
possible consequences or outcome events (OEs).   
In the examples, a range of IEs (A, B, C and D) and two SBs (SB1 and SB2), the respective 
TEs and OEs are identified. OE1 refers to safe condition, where both SB1 and SB2 function 
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despite TE occurs. If SB1 functions but SB2 fails, a near miss outcome event is viewed to 
occur denoted by OE2. An incident (OE3) will occur once SB1 fails however SB2 
fortunately works. Lastly, the worst OE is an accident (OE4), when neither SB1 nor SB2 
succeeds in mitigating the outcome of TE. 
 
 Step 2: Develop bow-tie model 
 
The fault tree (FT) and event tree (ET) are developed based on the causality and SBs 
identified in the accident scenario. The bow-tie model is then created to combine FT and 
ET. 
In the simulation example, for the AND gate, three cases are simulated. In the first case, IE 
A and IE B are connected by an AND gate, or A∩B, as expressed mathematically. The TE 
is believed to occur only if A and B occur simultaneously. There is also an AND gate 
connecting A, B, and C (A∩B∩C) in the second case, and A, B, C, and D (A∩B∩C∩D) in 
the third case.  
Using the OR gate, three cases are also simulated. In the first case, IE C and IE D are 
connected by an OR gate, or C∪D as a mathematical expression. The TE will occur if 
either C or D occurs or C and D occur at the same time. There is also an OR gate connecting 
B, C, and D (B∪C∪D) in the second case, and A, B, C, and D (A∪B∪C∪D) in the third 
case.  
Figure 2.2 shows the bow-tie models of both an AND gate example and an OR gate 
example in the case of 4 IEs. 
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Figure 2.2 Bow-tie models of the example in the case of 4 IEs (A, B, C, and D) and two 
logical operators: (a) AND gate; (b) OR gate. 
 
 
 Step 3: Derive occurrence probabilities of IEs and failure probabilities of 
SBs 
 
In a classical model, discrete values for probabilities are used to estimate the occurrence 
probabilities of OEs. In contrast, it is assumed that IEs probabilities and failure 
probabilities of SBs follow the Beta distribution, with selected parameters a and b in the 
proposed model. The failure probability distribution function is given as: 
f(x)∝xa-1 (1-x)b-1                                                                                                            (2.1) 
The mean value is a/(a+b) and the variance is ab/[(a+b)2(a+b+1)]. The parameters are 
selected such that the mean is equal to the discrete value of the IE probability or the failure 
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probability of the SB. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present the parameters of the Beta distribution for 
each IE and each SB used in the examples, respectively.  The adoption of these numbers is 
not rigorous but for sample calculations in the examples only. 
 
Table 2.1 Probability distributions for the IEs. 
    
 
 
Table 2.2 
Probability 
distributions 
for the SBs. 
Safety barrier Failure probability 
Discrete value Distribution Distribution parameter 
a b 
SB1 0.05 Beta 1 19 
SB2 0.15 Beta 3 17 
 
 Comparison study: Estimate TE and OEs probabilities considering 
independence of IEs and SBs 
 
Before moving to the proposed algorithm for probability estimation that incorporates 
Initiating 
event 
Occurrence probability 
Discrete value Distribution Distribution parameter 
a b 
A 0.1 Beta 1 9 
B 0.2 Beta 2 8 
C 0.3 Beta 3 7 
D 0.4 Beta 4 6 
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interdependence, the traditional bow-tie method is first used for comparison purpose. It is 
considered that the occurrence probabilities of IEs and the failure probabilities of SBs are 
independent. Then the discrete occurrence probability of an OE is estimated as the discrete 
probability of the TE multiplied by the discrete probabilities of failure or success of various 
SBs along the corresponding branch. The probability of the TE is calculated as the union 
of minimal cut sets.  
For example, the discrete probabilities of TE and OE3 in Figure 2.2-a are as follows. 
Pr(TE)=Pr(A).Pr(B).Pr(C).Pr(D)                                                                                        (2.2) 
Pr(OE3)=Pr(TE). Pr(SB1).Pr(𝑆𝐵2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)                                                                                   (2.3) 
where Pr(A) and Pr(B) are the discrete probabilities of IE A and of IE B, and Pr(SB1) and 
Pr(𝑆𝐵2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) refer to the discrete failure and non-failure probability of safety barriers SB1 and 
SB2, respectively. Other OEs probabilities are obtained similarly. 
 
 Step 4: Estimate TE and OEs probabilities considering interdependence of 
IEs and SBs 
 
Algorithm for probability estimation by Monte Carlo simulations 
To capture the correlation among IEs and SBs, copula functions are used. A copula is a 
multivariate probability distribution, where each random variable has a uniform marginal 
distribution on the unit interval [0, 1]. Because of the possibility for dependence among 
variables, a copula can be used to construct a new multivariate distribution for dependent 
variables. 
There are many kinds of multi-dimensional copulas. In this work, the Gaussian copula, 
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which is one of the most common copulas, is used. It is a simple yet flexible elliptical 
copula. A correlation matrix consisting of corresponding correlation parameters (ρ) is then 
designed according to the interactions among IEs and SBs.  
Subsequently, Monte Carlo integration is conducted to simulate the probabilities. In each 
trial, correlated random numbers with uniform distribution between 0 and 1 are first 
generated and compared with the random numbers that follow specific Beta distributions 
of corresponding IEs. If the uniform random number is smaller or equal to the random 
number of the IE, the IE will occur. The next step is the analysis of the intermediate event. 
If there is an AND gate connecting the IEs, the relative intermediate event will only occur 
when all the corresponding IEs occur. In the case of an OR gate, the intermediate event 
will occur when any corresponding IE occurs. By applying this analysis of the AND gate 
as well as the OR gate to the following intermediate events in the bow-tie model, whether 
the TE will occur or not in this trial can be finally confirmed. 
The right side of the bow-tie model, which is the ET, is then analyzed. Similar to the 
simulation of IEs, correlated random numbers are generated from the copula function that 
is applied to SBs. The results for which SBs fail in this trial can be derived by comparing 
these numbers with the random numbers that represent failure probabilities of respective 
SBs. These results determine the branch of the ET that points to the particular OE. This 
simulation is conducted for a million trials. The mean occurrence probabilities of the TE 
along with all the OEs are obtained. 
For the sake of simplicity, the correlation parameters of any two IEs in the examples are 
assumed to be identical, starting from 0.2 to 1. One of the correlation matrices used in the 
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case of A∩B∩C is shown in Table 2.3. 
Monte Carlo simulations with one million trials are conducted for the two examples. The 
correlation parameters used and the resulting mean occurrence probabilities of the TEs for 
both independent and interdependent cases are presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, where ρ 
being 0 signifies that the IEs are completely independent therefore the probabilities are 
calculated by use of the method discussed in Section 2.2.4, where ρ = 1 signifies that the 
IEs are deterministically related, while other correlation parameters that fall between 0 and 
1 signify that the IEs are partly dependent. 
 
Table 2.3 One of the correlation matrices for the case A∩B∩C. 
 
pA pB pC 
pA 1 0.8 0.8 
pB 0.8 1 0.8 
pC 0.8 0.8 1 
 
The effect of interdependence on the probability of TE for AND gate example 
Figure 2.3 demonstrates that the mean probabilities of the TEs increase significantly as ρ 
rises in the AND gate example. This is due to the AND gate logic. The positive correlation 
among IEs improves the system reliability to some extent because if one IE does not occur, 
the others are less likely to occur. Nevertheless, the improvement is not significant since 
only one of them needs to not occur to avoid the occurrence of the TE. Conversely, the 
positive correlation significantly decreases the system reliability: if one IE occurs, then 
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others are more likely to occur; this can lead to an increased TE probability. 
In addition, it is worth mentioning that the TE probability increases more dramatically 
when more IEs are correlated. For instance, the mean probability of the TE, given that ρ 
equals 1, is 3.98 times as large as when ρ equals 0 in the case of 2 IEs (A∩B). In contrast, 
the increase is 28.80 times in the case of 4 IEs (A∩B∩C∩D). 
It is interesting to note that the probability of the TE tends to approach the minimal IE 
probability, which is 0.1 in all three cases, when the dependence becomes stronger. This is 
because the minimal probability becomes dominant in the case of dependence for the AND 
gate. If the IE with the minimal probability occurs, other IEs also tend to occur, which will 
cause the TE to occur. It is also notable that the TE probability is closest to 0.1 when ρ 
equals 1 in the case of 2 IEs (A∩B). The TE probabilities are farther from 0.1 when ρ 
equals 1 in the cases of 3 IEs (A∩B∩C) and 4 IEs (A∩B∩C∩D), but the differences from 
the case of 2 IEs (A∩B) are not significant. 
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ρ 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
Mean probability of the TE in 
the case of 2 IEs (A∩B) 
0.0200 0.0283 0.0383 0.0498 0.0633 0.0789 
Mean probability of the TE in 
the case of 3 IEs (A∩B∩C) 
0.0060 0.0135 0.0241 0.0373 0.0543 0.0751 
Mean probability of the TE in 
the case of 4 IEs (A∩B∩C∩D) 
0.0024 0.0084 0.0186 0.0334 0.0515 0.0745 
 
Figure 2.3 The effect of interdependence among IEs on the probability of TE for AND 
gate example; data is also presented for analysis. 
 
The effect of interdependence on the probability of TE for OR gate example 
Figure 2.4 shows that the mean probabilities of the TE decrease steadily as ρ rises for the 
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OR gate example, which is due to the OR gate logic. The positive correlation among IEs 
decreases the system reliability slightly because if one IE occurs, the others are more likely 
to occur. However, the decrease is not significant, as the occurrence of any IE leads to the 
TE. Conversely, the positive correlation greatly improves the reliability: if one IE does not 
occur, then others are less likely to occur, leading to a decreased probability of TE.  
Also worth mentioning is that the TE probability decreases more substantially when more 
IEs are correlated. For instance, the mean probability of the TE when ρ equals 1 is 0.76 
times as large as when ρ equals 0 in the case of 2 IEs (C∪D). By contrast, the ratio is only 
0.65 times as large in the case of 4 IEs (A∪B∪C∪D). 
Contrary to the results in the AND gate example, the TE probability is closer to the maximal 
IE probability (0.4) in all three cases when there is stronger dependence. This is expected, 
as the maximal probability is dominant in the case of dependence for the OR gate. The 
occurrence of the IE with the maximal probability can lead to the occurrence of the TE. It 
is also notable that the TE probability is closest to 0.4 when ρ equals 1 in the case of 2 IEs 
(C∪D). The TE probabilities are farther from 0.4 when ρ equals 1 in the cases of 3 IEs 
(B∪C∪D) and 4 IEs (A∪B∪C∪D), but the differences from the case of 2 IEs (C∪D) are 
not significant. 
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ρ 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
Mean probability of the TE in 
the case of 2 IEs (C∪D) 
0.5800 0.5576 0.5323 0.5056 0.4770 0.4407 
Mean probability of the TE in 
the case of 3 IEs (B∪C∪D) 
0.6640 0.6241 0.5844 0.5428 0.5007 0.4489 
Mean probability of the TE in 
the case of 4 IEs (A∪B∪C∪D) 
0.6976 0.6483 0.6018 0.5544 0.5051 0.4504 
 
Figure 2.4 The effect of interdependence among IEs on the probability of TE for OR gate 
example; data is also presented for analysis. 
 
The effect of interdependence on the probability of OEs 
To further study the effect of dependence of IEs and SBs on the probability of OEs, the ρ 
between SB1 and SB2 is considered to be 0.8. The case of A∩B∩C, with the correlation 
0.0000
0.1000
0.2000
0.3000
0.4000
0.5000
0.6000
0.7000
0.8000
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
M
ea
n
 p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 o
f 
th
e 
T
E
Correlation parameters
2 IEs (C∪D)
3 IEs(B∪C∪D)
4 IEs(A∪B∪C∪D)
 32 
 
parameters being 0.8, is used to perform the simulation. 
Table 2.4 presents the results of the occurrence probabilities of the TE and the OEs for both 
independent and interdependent analyses. Results show that the outcome events’ 
probabilities increase drastically when dependence of causations is considered, compared 
to the independent case. It is clear that the TE probability increases, causing all the OEs to 
occur. The occurrence probability of an accident increases the most substantially, 
approximately 42 time, and the accident probability even exceeds the incident probability 
in the interdependent case.  
 
Table 2.4 Occurrence probabilities of the TE and the OEs in the case study. 
Symbol Event Independent 
case 
(Discrete value) 
Interdependent 
case 
(Mean value) 
 
Pr⁡(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
Pr⁡(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
 
TE    Top event 6.00E-03 5.42E-02 9.03 
OE1    Safe 
condition 
4.85E-03 4.52E-02 9.33 
OE2 Near miss 8.55E-04 6.30E-03 7.37 
OE3  Incident 2.55E-04 8.33E-04 3.27 
OE4 Accident 4.50E-05 1.90E-03 42.22 
MOE Major OEs  3.00E-04 2.73E-03 9.11 
 
 Step 5: Estimate the probability of major OEs  
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Major outcome events are defined as those consequences that cause severe loss, including 
fatalities or significant financial loss. In this case, incident (OE3) and accident (OE4) are 
considered to be major OEs. The probability of major OEs is estimated by combining the 
probability of OE3 and OE4. Results are presented in Table 2.4. It is clear that the 
occurrence probability of major OEs in the interdependent case is much larger than the 
probability in the independent case. 
 
 Application of the proposed methodology 
 
To test and verify the proposed methodology, a detailed case study is conducted. The 
methodology is applied to an accident scenario in a hexane distillation unit, adopted from 
a study by Markowski and Kotynia (2011). The installation is presented in Figure 2.5.  
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Figure 2.5 Hexane distillation column adapted from Markowski and Kotynia (2011). 
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 Steps 1-2: Identify accident scenarios and then develop the bow-tie model 
 
The Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) is used to identify accident scenarios. For the 
sake of simplification, only the catastrophic hexane release scenario is studied (Markowski 
and Kotynia, 2011). Safety and protection systems of the distillation unit comprise three 
safety layers, as shown in Table 2.5. The bow-tie model is developed for the accident 
scenario and is shown in Figure 2.6, in which OE2 and OE4 are viewed as major OEs. 
 
Table 2.5 Safety and protection systems. 
Safety layer Measure 
Layer I—prevention systems Good engineering practice (GEP) 
Basic Process Control Systems (BPCS) with indication 
and alarm in central room: BPCSPAH, BPCSTAH, 
BPCSTAL, BPCSLAL, BPCSFAL, BPCSTI, BPCSPI 
Layer II—protection systems Safety instrumented systems (SIS): 
SIST (TT, TIC, TCV), SISL (LT, LRC, LCV), SISF (FT, 
FIC, FCV), PSV, RD 
Layer III—mitigation systems    Automatic deluge system (Ads) 
Fire brigade (Fb) 
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Figure 2.6 Bow-tie accident scenario model for Hexane distillation example similar to 
one reported in (Markowski and Kotynia, 2011). 
 
 Step 3: Derive occurrence probabilities of IEs and failure probabilities of 
SBs 
 
The probability numbers for the conditioning events (CEs) as well as the safety functions 
(SFs) and the IEs are presented in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 respectively. It is notable that 
Markowski and Kotynia (2011) used fuzzy probability numbers for the IEs and standard 
probability numbers for the CEs, based on look-up tables developed in the LOPA book 
(CCPS, 2001) and experts’ knowledge and experience. The failure probabilities for the SFs 
are assumed based on experts’ judgement because they are not given in Markowski and 
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Kotynia (2011). In addition, all the probabilities are considered to follow Beta distribution 
with corresponding parameters.  
 
Table 2.6 The probabilities of the CEs and the failure probabilities of the SFs. 
Conditioning event and 
Safety function 
Symbol 
Probability 
Discrete 
value 
Distribution 
Distribution 
parameters 
a b 
Immediate ignition II 0.1 Beta 1.00 9.00 
Late ignition LI 0.5 Beta 5.00 5.00 
Failure of automatic deluge 
system 
Ads̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0.04 Beta 2.00 48.00 
Failure of fire brigade Fb̅̅ ̅ 0.2 Beta 2.00 8.00 
Fatalities in affected area Fa 0.1 Beta 1.00 9.00 
 
Table 2.7 Components of the IEs and their probabilities. 
Initiating event Symbol 
Failure probability 
Discrete value Distribution 
Distribution parameters 
a b 
Failure of PI-08 A 0.1 Beta 1.00 9.00 
Failure of PSV-02 B 0.01 Beta 1.00 99.00 
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Loss of water C 0.1 Beta 1.00 9.00 
Failure of TT-01 D 0.01 Beta 1.00 99.00 
Failure of TCV-01 E 0.1 Beta 1.00 9.00 
Failure of LCV-02 F 0.1 Beta 1.00 9.00 
Condenser rupture G 0.01 Beta 1.00 99.00 
Fouling H 0.001 Beta 1.00 999.00 
Failure of TIC-01 I 0.01 Beta 1.00 99.00 
Failure of TAH-01 J 0.1 Beta 1.00 9.00 
Failure of V1 K 0.1 Beta 1.00 9.00 
Failure of P-06 L 0.1 Beta 1.00 9.00 
Corrosion M 0.01 Beta 1.00 99.00 
Material defect N 0.01 Beta 1.00 99.00 
Human error O 0.01 Beta 1.00 99.00 
 
 Comparison study: Estimate TE and OEs probabilities considering 
independence of IEs, CEs and SFs 
 
For comparison, it is first assumed that the occurrence probabilities of the IEs are 
independent of each other. Similarly, the probabilities of CEs are also considered to be 
independent of the performance of the SFs. This assumption of independence is adopted in 
Markowski and Kotynia (2011). To simplify the calculation, the IEs, CEs and SFs are 
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designated discrete probability numbers. 
To derive the discrete probabilities of the TE and the OEs, one can adopt the method 
discussed in Section 2.2.4. In this case, for example, the probabilities of TE and OE2 are 
calculated as shown in the equations below: 
Pr(TE)=Pr(A)Pr(B)Pr(C)+Pr(A)Pr(B)Pr(G)+Pr(A)Pr(B)Pr(H)+Pr(A)Pr(B)Pr(D)+Pr(A)Pr(B
)Pr(E)+Pr(A)Pr(B)Pr(I)Pr(J)+Pr(A)Pr(B)Pr(F)Pr(K)+Pr(A)Pr(B)Pr(F)Pr(L)+Pr(M)+Pr(N)
+Pr(O)                                                                                                                           (2.4) 
Pr(OE2)=Pr(TE)Pr(II)Pr(𝐴𝑑𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)Pr(𝐹𝑏̅̅̅̅ )Pr(Fa)                                                       (2.5) 
where Pr(A), Pr(B),…, Pr(Fa) stand for the respective discrete probabilities in Tables 2.6 
and 2.7. All other OEs probabilities are obtained similarly. The discrete probability values 
of the TE and the OEs are summarized in Table 2.10. 
 
 Step 4: Estimate TE and OEs probabilities considering interdependence of 
IEs, CEs and SFs 
 
To demonstrate the advantage of the proposed methodology, the dependence among the 
IEs, CEs and SFs is considered in this case study. As Table 2.8 shows, B, E, F, and K are 
assumed to be correlated because they are all concerned with the failure of valves. However, 
the ρ between the failure of the temperature controlling valve (E) and the failure of the 
level controlling valve (F) is assumed to be 0.8. The ρ between the failure of the pressure 
safety valve (B) and the failure of valve 1 (K) is also considered to be 0.8. The ρ between 
B and E, B and F, E and K, or F and K is considered to be 0.6. In addition, it is assumed 
that the failure of the pressure indicator (A) and the failure of the pressure safety valve (B) 
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are correlated, with ρ being 0.8, because they compose the overpressure protection system. 
The ρ between A and E, F, or K is considered to be 0.6. These correlation parameters are 
presented in Table 2.8.  
A Gaussian copula with the correlation matrix shown in Table 2.9 is applied to the CEs and 
SFs. In general, there is a more significantly positive correlation of the CEs and SFs with 
their nearer neighbors. For instance, the ρ between the performance of fire brigade and 
fatalities is considered to be 0.8 while that between immediate ignition and fatalities is only 
0.5. This indicates that the failure of the fire brigade has a larger impact on fatalities. 
Probabilistic simulation with 1,000,000 iterations is done with these Gaussian copulas and 
the results of the mean probabilities of the TE and the OEs are summarized in Table 2.10.  
 
Table 2.8 Correlation parameters among IEs. 
 
pA pB pE pF pK 
pA 1 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 
pB 0.8 1 0.6 0.6 0.8 
pE 0.6 0.6 1 0.8 0.6 
pF 0.6 0.6 0.8 1 0.6 
pK 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6 1 
 
Table 2.9 Correlation parameters among CEs and SFs. 
 
pII pLI pAds̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ pFb̅̅ ̅ pFa 
pII 1 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 
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pLI 0.8 1 0.8 0.5 0.6 
pAds̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0.6 0.8 1 0.8 0.7 
pFb̅̅ ̅ 0.6 0.5 0.8 1 0.8 
pFa 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1 
 
Table 2.10 Result summary of occurrence probabilities of FOP, the TE and OEs. 
Symbol Event Independent 
case 
(Discrete value) 
Interdependent 
case 
(Mean value) 
 
Pr⁡(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
Pr⁡(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
 
FOP Failure of 
overpressure 
protection 
1.00E-04 6.90E-03 6.9 
TE    Hexane release 3.00E-02 3.37E-02 1.12 
OE1    Fire 
extinguished 
2.98E-03 2.99E-03 1.00 
OE2 Pool fire and 
fatalities 
2.40E-06 2.87E-04 119.58 
OE2b  Pool fire 2.16E-05 2.24E-04 10.37 
OE3 Spill/dispersion 2.65E-02 3.04E-02 1.15 
OE4 VCE/FF and 
fatalities 
5.40E-05 3.46E-04 6.41 
OE4b VCE/FF 4.86E-04 4.58E-04 0.94 
 42 
 
MOE Major OEs 
where fatalities 
occur 
5.64E-05 6.33E-04 11.22 
 
 Step 5: Estimate the probability of major outcome events  
 
The probability of major outcome events is estimated by combining the probabilities of 
OEs where fatalities occur (OE2 and OE4). These probability results for both independent 
and interdependent cases are presented in Table 2.10. 
 
 Discussion 
 
 The effect of interdependence on the probability of the top event 
 
Table 2.10 shows that the probability of failure of overpressure protection (FOP) increases 
significantly when the correlation model is applied. The probability of FOP in the 
interdependent case is 7.9 times larger compared to the independent case. In contrast, there 
is only a slight increase in the probability of the top event (hexane release). The reasons 
for such changes are described below.  
FOP is an AND gate connecting two initiating events: A (failure of PI-08) and B (failure of 
PSV-02), meaning that the overpressure will only fail when both PI-08 and PSV-02 fail to 
function. Thus, the probability of FOP is believed to approach the probability of B, which 
equals 0.01 in the interdependent case. The minimal cut sets of the top event obtained from 
the bow-tie model is as follows. 
 43 
 
∑MCSTE=ABC+ABG+ABH+ABD+ABE+ABIJ+ABFK+ABFL+M+N +O                                   (2.6) 
It is obvious that the probabilities of ABC, ABG…, ABFL will increase when A, B, E 
(failure of TCV-01), F (failure of LCV-02) and K (failure of V1) are positively dependent, 
as defined by the correlation parameters in Table 2.8. This increase will finally result in the 
rise of the top event probability. However, the effect of dependence on the probability of 
the top event is insignificant since the combined probability of M (corrosion), N (material 
defect) and O (human error) is dominant in this case. Even though the increase of the top 
event probability is relatively small in this specific case, it is still important to pay attention 
to possible dependent causes of abnormal conditions in risk assessment, because the effect 
of dependence under other circumstances may be substantial.   
   
 The effect of interdependence on the probability of the outcome events 
 
It is clear from Table 2.10 that when considering the dependence among the initiating 
events, conditioning events and safety functions, the occurrence probabilities of certain 
outcome events change dramatically. The increase of the top event probability, as discussed 
previously, is the reason why the probabilities of most outcome events increase despite that 
of OE4b. It is notable that the probabilities of the major consequences (OE2 and OE4) 
increase sharply (119.58 times and 10.37 times as large as in the independent case 
respectively). This can be explained as the followings. Because the conditioning events and 
safety functions are correlated, the branch that follows the sequence of immediate ignition, 
failure of the automatic deluge system, failure of the fire brigade and fatalities, is most 
likely to occur in this event tree. Furthermore, it is clear from Eq. 2.5 that the OE2 
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probability tends to approach the top event probability multiplied by the minimal 
occurrence probability among conditioning events and safety functions. Therefore, the 
probability of OE2 increases most substantially. Similarly, the probabilities of OE2b and 
OE4 both increase greatly, but the increase is not as large as OE2. Conversely, the 
probability of OE4b decreases.  
Table 2.10 also shows that the effect of dependence on outcome events probabilities is 
more prominent than that of a top event probability. This indicates that the correlated safety 
barriers have significant impacts on the occurrence probabilities of outcome events. If 
feasible, it is suggested that independent barriers be added into safety systems. 
 
 Conclusions  
 
This work has revised the bow-tie analysis by integrating the dependence among causation 
factors. The revised bow-tie model, when run in probabilistic mode using Monte Carlo 
simulations, provides more reliable and robust results. This is established revisiting a past 
case study and comparing the results. The considerable difference between the respective 
results reveals that the effect of dependence is significant and thus should be considered 
when assessing risks of a process system. 
The revised methodology is a simple adoption of the copula function to represent the 
dependency. This revised methodology serves as a useful and easy to adopt tool to analyze 
risk in a process system. It has the ability to model a complex engineering system where 
dependencies are inherent. Another important feature of the revision is its ability to capture 
and represent dependencies among the safety barriers and most importantly, to represent a 
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common failure model. This work could further be improved by transforming the bow-tie 
into a network-based approach such as a Bayesian network or the Petri net along with 
dependence modeling, using the copula function.  
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Chapter 3. Copula-based Bayesian network model for process system 
risk assessment2 
 
Abstract 
Risk assessment is an essential exercise for process systems from early conceptual design 
to operation and subsequently during decommissioning. Risk assessment methods have 
evolved over the past two decades from index-based methods to detailed quantitative 
methods. The Bayesian network (BN) is a recently developed technique used for risk 
assessment that utilizes updating, adapting and discrete-time-based analysis properties. 
Although the BN is a powerful technique, it continues to face the challenge of modelling 
non-linear complex correlations of process components. This paper proposes a copula-
based Bayesian network model that assists in overcoming the challenge of non-linear 
relationships. In addition to defining conditional probabilities, the copulas are also used to 
describe the joint probability densities of the network nodes in the BN. Application of the 
proposed model is demonstrated using a process accident case study. The results reveal that 
the proposed model is effective in estimating more reliable accident probabilities. A 
sensitivity analysis is also conducted to identify important factors that need to be monitored 
to prevent accident occurrence. Though the focus of the present study is on process systems, 
the proposed model is applicable to most engineering systems. 
Key words: Risk assessment; Bayesian network; Dependence; Copula; Process safety; 
Accident model 
                                                     
2 C.Guo et al. Submitted in revised form to Process Safety and Environmental Protection. 
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 Introduction 
 
Process industries deal with hazardous substances in large quantities. The release of these 
materials can result in severe consequences including the loss of life, environmental 
damage, and financial losses. As the nature of process operation is becoming more complex 
due to process integration and digitalization, process safety management is becoming a key 
concern, and risk assessment is an important step in process safety management. Many 
approaches are available to conduct risk analyses of process systems. Among them, Layer 
of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a comprehensive yet easy-to-use risk assessment 
technique. LOPA is a semi-quantitative approach which considers three layers of safety and 
protection systems. The first layer is prevention systems, including Basic Process Control 
Systems (BPCS) with indicators and alarms; the second layer consists of Safety 
Instrumented Systems (SIS), while the third layer refers to mitigation systems such as the 
deluge system (CCPS, 2001). CCPS (2001) has proposed a range of occurrence (or failure 
on demand) probabilities of these systems. These probabilities are derived from plant data 
and expert judgement. 
Although LOPA is a recommended approach and widely used, it has some inherent 
limitations. For instance, the causal analysis of an accident is too simple, and the predicted 
probability is vague and often unrealistic.  
As an alternative, the Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) approach is a detailed logical 
reasoning-based method used to make more realistic probabilistic estimations of accident 
scenarios (CCPS, 2003). The QRA approach is built upon fault tree analysis (FTA) and 
event tree analysis (ETA). FTA identifies the probable initiating events i.e. failures of BPCS 
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and SIS that cause the top event. ETA presents all the possible outcomes resulting from a 
top event.  
The bow-tie (BT) technique combines FTA and ETA and has been proven to be a robust 
risk assessment tool. De Dianous and Fievez (2006) used BT in the ARAMIS project to 
demonstrate risk control. Recently, BT has commonly been used together with other 
techniques. Lu et al. (2015), for example, proposed a risk evaluation method that combines 
both a risk matrix and bow-tie for natural gas pipelines. Aqlan and Mustafa Ali (2014) 
assessed the risk of a chemical plant by integrating lean manufacturing principles and fuzzy 
BT. 
The Bayesian network (BN) is an emerging graphical tool used for the risk analysis of 
chemical process systems. In contrast to the static nature of BT, BN makes use of the 
accident precursor data recorded during the lifecycle of a chemical plant to conduct 
probability adapting. Another feature of BN is that it can consider dependent failures, 
which BT is unable to do. BN is dependent on the linear relationships among correlated 
variables defined by the means of Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs). Such dependence 
construction is widely discussed and used by many researchers  (Ale et al., 2014, Islam et 
al., 2018, Khakzad et al., 2013, Pasman and Rogers, 2013). The traditional BN is unable to 
model complex interrelationships, such as non-linear dependence among correlated 
variables (Mohseni Ahooyi et al., 2014).  
To address this challenge, the use of copulas is introduced to process safety analysis. Meel 
and Seider (2006) provided a failure assessment of an exothermic CSTR (Continuous 
Stirred Tank Reactor) with copulas representing dependent failure probabilities of safety 
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systems. Pariyani et al. (2012) studied two different copula families to model the safety, 
quality, and operability systems (SQOSs) interactions. As a powerful model for 
constructing the dependence among continuous variables, copula applications have been 
frequently implemented in a wide range of fields such as near-miss analysis (Oktem et al., 
2013), risk monitoring in managed pressure drilling (Hashemi et al., 2016) and disruption 
lengths modelling (Zilko et al., 2016). Most recently, Guo et al. (2018) proposed a revised 
bow-tie model that incorporates copula functions. Nevertheless, the integration of copulas 
to BN for process modelling and risk assessment has yet to be considered. 
This study presents an integration of copulas with the Bayesian network to represent non-
linear dependencies. Multiple copula functions are explored to identify the most 
appropriate functions that define variables’ dependencies. The integrated model has the 
strengths and flexibility of both BN and copulas. It can be applied to accident analysis in 
engineering fields where there are potential dependencies among the causes  
Section 3.2 of this paper presents detailed steps to build a copula-based BN model with an 
illustrative example. In Section 3.3, the proposed model and the conventional BN are 
applied to a real-life reboiler rupture case study. Results from both approaches are 
compared and discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents a sensitivity analysis to 
identify the most influential causation factors, while Section 3.6 is devoted to a diagnostic 
analysis of the case study. The main highlights of the current work are summarized in 
Section 3.7. 
 
 The proposed copula-based Bayesian network model 
 
 52 
 
To define the non-linear and complex dependencies of a process system, the copula-based 
Bayesian network (CBBN) model is proposed. This model enhances the traditional 
Bayesian network (BN) by equipping it with copula functions. Figure 3.1 shows the steps 
to develop a CBBN. An example is also provided to accommodate the detailed description 
of each step in the following subsections. 
 
Step 1: Identify network nodes
Step 2: Develop Bayesian network
Step 3: Assign occurrence probabilities to 
network nodes
Step 4:  Add copula functions to the developed 
Bayesian network
Consider a process system
Step 5:  Estimate the outcome event 
probabilities of the developed CBBN
 
Figure 3.1 Steps for developing a CBBN. 
 
3.2.1 Step 1: Identify network nodes 
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At first, the outcome events (OEs) of interest for the focused process system are identified. 
Then, the causal analysis is conducted to identify the potential root causes. These root 
causes and OEs are represented by network nodes in the proposed model. Each cause node 
has two states, occurrence and non-occurrence.  
In the examples, the OEs and their causes (A, B, C) are identified. Table 3.1 presents the 
eight states of this OE node with the specific state combination of A, B and C. 
 
Table 3.1 Possible outcome events based on the state combination of nodes A, B and C. 
A B C Outcome event 
Yes Yes Yes OE1 
Yes Yes   No OE2 
Yes  No Yes OE3 
Yes   No No OE4 
No Yes  Yes OE5 
No Yes No OE6 
No No Yes OE7 
No No No OE8 
 
3.2.2 Step 2: Develop Bayesian network 
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Once the network nodes are identified, a Bayesian network (BN) is developed to connect 
the causes and the OE node. In a BN, the causal arcs between cause nodes and the OE node 
mean that the state of the OE node is determined by the occurrence or non-occurrence of 
the causes. In contrast, the arc drawn from one cause node to the other indicates that the 
occurrence probability of the latter cause is affected by whether the former cause occurs or 
not.    
The BN model for the example is shown in Figure 3.2, in which A is named the root node 
because there are only arcs starting from it. The OE node is a leaf node with arcs merely 
pointing to itself, while B and C are both intermediate nodes, as there are arcs from and to 
them. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 BN model for the example. 
 
3.2.3 Step 3: Assign occurrence probabilities to network nodes 
 
Occurrence probability numbers are first assigned to the respective root nodes. 
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Subsequently, conditional probabilities denoting conditional dependencies are assigned to 
the intermediate nodes. These probability numbers are estimated according to the causal 
relationships between the correlated nodes.  
Table 3.2 presents the assumed occurrence probabilities of the network nodes in the 
example. For instance, the probability of C|A,B is assigned to be 0.3, meaning that the 
occurrence probability of C when A and B have already occurred is 0.3.   
 
Table 3.2 Occurrence probabilities of the network nodes in the example. 
Network node                                          Probability 
A 0.3 
B|A 0.7 
B|A̅ 0.4 
C|A,B 0.3 
C|A̅,B 0.4 
C|A,B̅ 0.5 
C|A̅,B̅ 0.8 
 
3.2.4 Step 4: Add copula functions to the developed Bayesian network  
 
This is the key step in building the copula-based Bayesian network (CBBN), in which 
copulas are employed to describe the complex dependencies among cause nodes. Copulas 
are useful functions that provide an easy way to create distributions modelling dependent 
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variables (Shemyakin and Kniazev, 2017). From the various types of multi-dimensional 
copulas, the multivariate normal copula, also called the Gaussian copula, has been chosen 
for the present study. The Gaussian copula has flexibility in modeling both positive and 
negative correlations (Pariyani et al., 2012). The degree of correlations is then represented 
by pairwise correlation coefficients between nodes, all of which compose a correlation 
matrix. In this way, a CBBN model is built to model both the linear and non-linear 
dependence within a system. 
Table 3.3 presents the correlation matrix used in this example. Overall, the correlation 
between A and B is assumed to be positive while that between B and C is assumed to be 
negative. As a result, the correlation between A and C should be negative. In addition, the 
strength of correlations of these three pairs is assumed to be equal. 
 
Table 3.3 Correlation parameters for the example.  
 
P(A) P(B) P(C) 
P(A) 1 0.6 -0.6 
P(B) 0.6 1 -0.6 
P(C) -0.6 -0.6 1 
 
3.2.5 Step 5: Estimate the outcome event probabilities of the developed CBBN 
 
One million iterations of the Monte Carlo simulation are performed to estimate the mean 
occurrence probabilities of the outcome events in the developed CBBN. The simulation 
algorithm used here is similar to that used in Guo et al. (2018). Such simulation does bring 
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some computational difficulties and burdens which require programming. However, the 
algorithm has been realized efficiently in Matlab®. 
Table 3.4 provides the outcome probabilities of the CBBN example. Moreover, to study 
the effect of the dependence degree on probability estimation, a sensitivity analysis for 
OE2 is also conducted and presented in Figure 3.3. 
 
 Table 3.4 Occurrence probabilities of the OEs for the example in BN and CBBN. 
Outcome 
event 
BN model 
(Deterministic value) 
CBBN model 
(Mean value) 
 
P(CBBN)
P(BN)
 
OE1    0.063 0.017 0.27 
OE2 0.147 0.260 1.77 
OE3  0.045 0.011 0.25 
OE4 0.045 0.011 0.25 
OE5 0.112 0.051 0.45 
OE6 0.168 0.141 0.84 
OE7 0.336 0.480 1.43 
OE8 0.084 0.028 0.34 
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Correlatio
n 
parameter 
change 
-50% -40% -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
OE2 
probability 
0.205 0.217 0.229 0.239 0.250 0.260 0.270 0.279 0.287 0.295 0.299 
OE2 
probability 
change 
-21% -17% -12% -8% -4% 0% 4% 7% 11% 14% 15% 
 
Figure 3.3 Variation of OE2 probability as dependence strength changes. (Data also 
included) 
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3.2.6 Comparison: Estimate the outcome event probabilities of the developed 
BN  
 
To distinguish the proposed CBBN model from the traditional BN model, the deterministic 
probabilities of the outcome events in the BN are also estimated.  
Taking OE7, for example, without considering copulas, the deterministic probability is 
simply as follows. 
P(OE7)=P( A̅ )P( B̅ | A̅ )P(C| A̅ , B̅ )=[1- P(A)][1-P(B| A̅ )]P(C| A̅ , B̅ )=(1-0.3)(1-0.4)0.8=0.336                                                                        
(3.1)     
Similarly, other outcome event probabilities have been derived and summarized in Table 
3.4. 
 
3.2.7 Discussion of the results for the example  
 
Table 3.4 shows that the probabilities of OE2 and OE 7 in CBBN are larger than those in 
BN. Conversely, other outcome event probabilities in CBBN are smaller than those in BN. 
These are caused by the effect of the copula. As Table 3.3 shows, nodes A and B are 
positively correlated, nodes A and C are negatively correlated, and nodes B and C are 
negatively correlated. Thus, when A occurs, B also tends to occur. Subsequently, C tends 
to not occur, leading to the increased probability of OE2. In contrast, when neither A nor B 
occurs, C is more likely to occur, which increases OE7 probability.  
As can be seen in Figure 3.3, OE2 probability rises steadily as the dependence grows 
stronger. When there is a small increase or decrease in correlation parameters (ρ), the 
absolute change in OE2 probability is almost identical. For instance, a +20% or -20% 
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change in correlation parameters only results in about a +7% or -8% change, respectively, 
in estimated OE2 probability, which are very close. Nevertheless, as the percentage change 
of correlation parameters becomes larger, the probability of OE2 decreases faster than it 
increases. Figure 3.3 shows that OE2 probability falls by 21%, compared to its increase of 
only 15% when the deviation in strength of dependence is 50%. Specifically, a -50% fall 
in correlation parameters (i.e., |ρ|=0.3) decreases OE2 probability to 0.205, approaching its 
value calculated in the case of the BN model (0.147). In contrast, a +50% rise in correlation 
parameters (i.e., |ρ|=0.9) increases OE2 probability to 0.299, near the probability of node 
A (0.3). This phenomenon was illustrated in Guo et al. (2018), which argued that for AND 
logic, the probability of an outcome tends to approach the minimal probabilities of its 
causation factors when there is high dependence among them. As a result, the maximal 
increased OE2 probability can only reach 0.3, showing that the limit of increase in the 
probability of OE2 is smaller than that of decrease. 
To conclude this sensitivity analysis, the percent change in OE2 probability is symmetrical 
when the percent change in correlation parameters is relatively small but then becomes 
asymmetrical when the extent of change in correlation parameters is larger. 
 
 Application of the copula-based Bayesian network 
 
To validate the proposed CBBN model for modeling complex dependencies in risk analysis, 
a practical case report issued by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Identification Board 
is examined. As can be found in the incident report, the June 13, 2013 reboiler rupture, 
explosion and fire at the Williams Geismar Olefins Plant caused 2 fatalities and 167 injuries 
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(CSB, 2016). The ruptured reboiler used to be part of the propylene fractionator shown in 
Figure 3.4. It is notable that there are two reboilers: Reboiler A and Reboiler B, and both 
operated continuously in the original design. When the reboilers were fouled and needed 
cleaning, the process had to be shut down. In 2001, block valves (gate and ball valves) 
were installed on the reboiler piping. In this way, the process could continue to work with 
only one reboiler operating when the other fouled reboiler required maintenance. This 
fouled reboiler was then cleaned and set on standby mode (CSB, 2016). 
Reboiler A Reboiler B
Quench Water System
Propane Recycle
Propylene/Propane Feed
Propylene
Fractionator
Propylene Product
Reflux Drum
PCPT FCV
Pressure relief valve protected propylene
fractionator and shells of Reboilers A and B
Gate valves installed on shell-side reboiler
piping in 2001
Ball valves installed on tube-side reboiler
piping in 2001
Legend
 
Figure 3.4 Propylene fractionator column (CSB,2016). 
 
3.3.1 Steps 1-2: Identify network nodes and develop Bayesian network 
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Through detailed causal analysis of this incident, the root, intermediate and leaf nodes are 
identified. Linking all the nodes, the Bayesian network for this accident scenario is 
developed. Figure 3.5 shows the BN, where propane mixture releases and boiling liquid 
expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) is the top event. As the performances of the safety 
barriers vary, this top event may result in various outcomes of different severities. These 
outcome events are presented in Table 3.5, in which OE3 and OE6 are considered to be 
major events since fatalities will occur. It should be clarified that the consideration of the 
safety barriers and the classification of the outcome events are partly based on (Markowski 
and Kotynia, 2011; Khakzad et al., 2013).    
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Figure 3.5 Bayesian network for propane release from Reboiler B. 
 
Table 3.5 Outcome event nodes depending on the performance of safety nodes. 
Immediate 
ignition barrier 
Late ignition 
barrier 
Sprinkler Alarm Outcome event  
work work - - Dispersion (OE1) 
work fail work - Dispersion (OE1) 
work fail fail work 
Vapor cloud explosion (VCE)/Flash 
fire (FF) (OE2) 
work  fail fail fail VCE/FF and fatalities (OE3) 
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fail - work - Fire extinguished (OE4) 
fail - fail work Fireball (OE5) 
fail - fail fail Fireball and fatalities (OE6) 
 
3.3.2 Step 3: Determine occurrence probabilities of network nodes 
 
To conduct an in-depth investigation and simulation of this real incident, occurrence 
probabilities of the cause nodes are assumed to follow time-dependent exponential 
distribution. According to the case study report (CSB, 2016), the propylene fractionator 
with block valves had operated for 12 years and Reboiler B had remained on standby for a 
period of 16 months when the incident occurred. Taking into account both the operation 
time and the failure frequencies collected from CCPS (2014), the failure probabilities of 
these causes are calculated and illustrated in Table 3.6.  
For example, the reliability of the flow transmitter after 12 years of service, denoted by 
R(FT), equals e-0.01/yr×12yrs=0.887. Therefore, the failure probability P(FT) equals [1-
R(FT)]=0.113. Similarly, the probability that the gate valves were mistakenly opened 
during the 16 months (approximately 1.33 yrs) while Reboiler B was on standby is 1- e-
001/yr×1.33yrs=0.125. 
 
Table 3.6 Occurrence probabilities of the cause nodes. 
Network node Symbol Frequency (/yr) Probability 
Gate valves leaked  GVbL 0.001 0.012 
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Failure of quench water flow 
transmitter 
FT 0.01 0.113 
Failure of quench water flow 
controller 
FC 0.01 0.113 
Failure of quench water flow 
controlling valve 
FCV 0.1 0.699 
Failure of inlet gate valve due to 
plugging, choking, structural flaw 
IGVb 0.1 0.699 
Failure of outlet gate valve due to 
plugging, choking, structural flaw 
OGVb 0.1 0.699 
Failure of relief valve RV 0.01 0.113 
Gate valves mistakenly opened GVbO 0.1 0.125 
Inlet ball valve mistakenly opened IBVbO 0.1 0.125 
Outlet ball valve mistakenly 
opened 
OBVbO 0.1 0.125 
Propane fluid entered Reboiler B - - OR gate 
Quench water entered Reboiler B - - AND gate 
Failure to control quench water 
flow 
- - OR gate 
Overheating - - AND gate 
Reboiler B isolated from 
overpressure protection 
- - AND gate 
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Failure of overpressure protection - - OR gate 
Overpressure - - AND gate 
Propane mixture release and 
BLEVE 
- - AND gate 
 
 Table 3.7 Safety nodes and their probabilities (CCPS (2001); OREDA (2002)). 
Network node Symbol Probability 
Failure of immediate ignition barrier IIB 0.2 
Failure of late ignition barrier LIB 0.5 
Failure of sprinkler SP 0.150, 0.04 
Failure of alarm AL 0.225, 0.13 
 
While determining the failure probabilities of the safety nodes, conditional dependencies 
are considered. It is shown in Table 3.7 that there are two probability numbers for either 
sprinkler or alarm. This means that failure probabilities of the sprinkler and alarm depend 
on the performance of immediate and late ignition barriers (IIB and LIB). In the case of 
IIB works but LIB fails or in other words late ignition occurs, the failure probabilities of 
the sprinkler and alarm are higher (0.15 and 0.225, respectively). In the other case of IIB 
fails, i.e. released propane ignites immediately, the failure probabilities are lower, being 
0.04 and 0.13.    
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3.3.3 Step 4: Integrate copula functions to the developed Bayesian network 
 
After analyzing the possible interrelationships of the network nodes, reasonable correlation 
matrices are designed and shown in Tables 3.8-.3.11. As Table 3.8 shows, the correlation 
parameter (ρ) between the causes that let quench water enter Reboiler B is assumed as 0.8, 
which means there is very significant dependence. This is because it is likely that both the 
inlet ball valve (IBVbO) and the outlet ball valve (OBVbO) of Reboiler B were mistakenly 
opened. For a similar reason, the failures of the inlet gate valve (IGVb) and the outlet gate 
valve (OGVb) probability occur simultaneously, justifying the assumption that the ρ 
between these two should be 0.7, indicating significant dependence, as shown in Table 3.10. 
Table 3.9 shows that the failures of the flow transmitter (FT), flow controller (FC) a d flow 
controlling valve (FCV) are moderately dependent (i.e. ρ=0.6) since these components 
make up the quench water control system and therefore work under the same environment. 
Table 3.11 presents the dependence strengths among the safety nodes represented by 
pairwise correlation parameters. On average, it is assumed that the dependence between a 
safety node and its closer neighboring node is more significant due to potentially stronger 
interactions.   
The Gaussian copulas with these correlation parameters are then added to the existing BN, 
building the CBBN, where both linear and non-linear dependence of the network nodes are 
considered. 
 
Table 3.8 Correlation parameters between the causes of quench water entering Reboiler 
B. 
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P(IBVbO) P(OBVbO) 
P(IBVbO) 1 0.8 
P(OBVbO) 0.8 1 
 
Table 3.9. Correlation parameters within quench water flow control system. 
 
P(FT) P(FC) P(FV) 
P(FT) 1 0.6 0.6 
P(FC) 0.6 1 0.6 
P(FV) 0.6 0.6 1 
 
Table 3.10 Correlation parameters between the causes of Reboiler B isolated from 
overpressure protection. 
 
P(IGVb) P(OGVb) 
P(IGVb) 1 0.7 
P(OGVb) 0.7 1 
 
Table 3.11 Correlation parameters among safety nodes. 
 
P(IIB) P(LIB) P(SP) P(AL) 
P(IIB) 1 0.8 0.7 0.6 
P(LIB) 0.8 1 0.8 0.7 
P(SP) 0.7 0.8 1 0.8 
P(AL) 0.6 0.7 0.8 1 
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3.3.4 Step 5: Estimate the top event and outcome event probabilities of the developed 
CBBN 
 
Probabilistic simulations of 1 million trials employing the algorithm described in Section 
2.5 are performed to estimate the mean probabilities of the top and outcome events. Results 
are presented in Table 3.12. 
 
Table 3.12 Result summary of occurrence probabilities of the top event and outcome 
events in both BN and CBBN. 
Symbol Event BN model 
(Discrete value) 
CBBN model  
(Mean value) 
 
P(CBBN)
P(BN)
 
TE    Propane mixture release 
and BLEVE 
8.83E-04 4.50E-03 5.10 
OE1    Dispersion 6.53E-04 3.36E-03 5.15 
OE2 VCE/FF 4.11E-05 7.23E-05 1.76 
OE3 VCE/FF and fatalities 1.19E-05 1.64E-04 13.82 
OE4 Fire extinguished 1.70E-04 7.54E-04 4.44 
OE5 Fireball  6.14E-06 2.43E-05 3.96 
OE6 Fireball and fatalities 9.18E-07 1.21E-04 132.08 
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3.3.5 Comparison: Estimate the top event and outcome event probabilities of the 
developed BN 
 
As a comparison, the developed Bayesian network model, which only captures linear 
dependence, is also studied. The probabilities of the top event and OE6 are calculated as 
shown below: 
P(TE)=(GVbL+GVbO-GVbL×GVbO)IBVbO×OBVbO(FT+FC+FCV-FT×FC-FC×FCV-
FT×FCV+FT×FC×FCV)(IGVb×OGVb+RV-IGVb×OGVb×RV)                                           (3.2) 
P(OE6)=P(TE)P(IIB)P(SP|IIB)P(AL|IIB)                                                                      (3.3) 
Where GVbL, GVbO,…, P(AL|IIB) represent the respective probabilities in Tables 3.6 and 
3.7. Similarly, the probabilities of other outcome events are derived and presented in Table 
3.12. 
 
 Discussion 
 
3.4.1 The top event probability in CBBN and BN 
 
Table 3.12 shows that the probability of the top event in CBBN is significantly larger than 
that in BN, which can be explained by the effect of non-linear dependencies of the root 
nodes as defined by Tables 3.8-3.10. Root nodes IBVbO and OBVbO are positively 
correlated under the AND gate and so are the nodes IGVb and OGVb. This correlation 
leads to the increased probabilities of the respective intermediate nodes, which tend to 
approach 0.125 and 0.699, almost 8 and 1.43 times as large as the BN case. This increase 
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finally contributes to the increased top event probability. There is an OR gate connecting 
the dependent root nodes FT, FC and FV, causing the decreased probability of the 
intermediate node Failure to control quench water flow. However, this probability only 
drops from 0.763 to nearly 0.699. Such an increase for the AND gate as well as a decrease 
for the OR gate in intermediate node probabilities are explained in (Guo et al., 2018). As 
Eq. (3.2) shows, compared to the significant increased probabilities resulting from the 
dependence within AND gates, this decrease does not have a large effect on the top event 
probability. As a result, the probability of propane release and BLEVE is 5.10 times as 
large in CBBN as in BN. 
   
3.4.2 The outcome event probabilities in CBBN and BN 
 
Table 3.12 shows that the probabilities of all the outcome events are also obviously greater 
in CBBN than in BN. In the BN for this scenario, only the conditional dependence of the 
performances of the sprinkler and alarm on the performance of the immediate ignition 
barrier are defined by Table 3.7. While in CBBN, non-linear dependence is also 
incorporated by correlation parameters as presented in Tables 3.8-3.11. The increased top 
event probability as explained in Section 4.1 accounts for the increase of all the outcome 
event probabilities. In particular, the probabilities of OE3 and OE6, where fatalities occur, 
increase most sharply. This is because the positive non-linear dependence among the safety 
nodes increases the occurrence probability that most or all safety barriers fail at the same 
time, which results in OE3 or OE6. Quantitatively speaking, similar to the demonstration 
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in Section 3.2.7, the occurrence probability of OE3 and OE6 in CBBN gets close to the 
failure probability of the sprinkler under late ignition and under immediate ignition, 
respectively. Therefore, as is shown in Table 3.12, the probabilistic differences in terms of 
the ratio between CBBN and BN for OE3 and OE6 are 13.82 and 132.08, respectively. 
 
 Sensitivity analysis 
 
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the tornado diagrams of the sensitivity analyses for OE6 in the 
developed BN and CBBN, respectively. The horizontal axis shows the absolute change in 
the posterior probability of OE6 when the probability of each initiating event or safety 
barrier changes by 20%. 
As can be seen from Figure 3.6, Failure of immediate ignition barrier (IIB), Outlet ball 
valve mistakenly opened (OBVbO), Inlet ball valve mistakenly opened (IBVbO), Alarm 
failure given that immediate ignition barrier fails (AL|IIB) and Failure of sprinkler given 
that immediate ignition barrier fails (SP|IIB) are the most and equally sensitive causes for 
OE6 in the developed BN. As Eq. (3.3) shows, a 20% change in the probability of any one 
from these 5 nodes results in exactly a 20% change in OE6 probability. 
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Figure 3.6 Sensitivity analysis for OE6 in BN. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Sensitivity analysis for OE6 in CBBN. 
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In contrast, Figure 3.7 shows that Failure of quench water flow controlling valve (FCV) is 
the most sensitive cause for OE6 in the developed CBBN. This is due to the effect of 
dependence on the OR gate: the probability of the intermediate node tends to approach the 
maximal root node probability when there is dependence among root nodes. In this case, 
FCV accounts for the largest failure probability leading to the intermediate node Failure to 
control quench water flow. Consequently, FCV is dominant in determining the probability 
of this intermediate node and thus significantly affects the top event and then OE6 
probability. Gate valves mistakenly opened (GVbO) is shown to be the second most 
sensitive parameter because its probability is much larger than the Gate valves leaked 
(GVbL) probability. 
Figure 3.7 also shows that OE6 is thirdly sensitive to SP|IIB. The reason is concerned with 
the AND logic of an event tree, which means that OE6 probability depends more on the 
safety nodes with smaller probabilities. Therefore, the impact of AL|IIB and IIB becomes 
less significant in comparison with the case of BN. In addition, it is clear that IBVbO and 
OBVbO both rank as the 4th sensitive parameters. This is because of the effect of 
dependence on the AND gate: the intermediate node probability will get closer to the 
minimal root node probability when the dependence is considered. Returning to this 
example, the initial probability of Quench water entering Reboiler B is close to 0.699, the 
probability value of both IBVbO and OBVbO. When the probability value of IBVbO 
decreases by 20%, for instance, the intermediate node probability will get closer to this 
decreased probability number of IBVbO, resulting in a sharp decrease in OE6 probability. 
In contrast, the probability of OE6 does not change as considerably as the former analysis 
 75 
 
for decrease when there is a 20% increase in IBVbO probability, because the intermediate 
node probability still tends to approach 0.699, which is the probability of OBVbO as the 
minimal probability.  
 
 Probability updating 
 
Probability updating is usually performed to find the most probable causes of a specific 
outcome event (Abimbola et al., 2015). Abimbola et al. (2015) and Khakzad et al. (2013) 
have conducted exhaustive updating of node probabilities in a Bayesian network based on 
Bayes theorem. In this paper, the updating analysis is performed by GeNIe 2.1 
(https://www.bayesfusion.com/genie/). 
According to the accident report (CSB, 2016), a rupture in Reboiler B caused BLEVE and 
a large amount of propane mixture release, which ignited, resulting in a fireball and two 
fatalities. Therefore, the state of node Outcome event is instantiated to OE6. Figure 3.8 
shows the posterior probabilities of the other nodes based on this evidence. The most 
probable causes of OE6 are determined to be as follows. The gate valves were mistakenly 
opened, letting propane fluid enter Reboiler B. Quench water entered Reboiler B by 
mistakenly opened ball valves and the failure of the quench water flow controlling system 
due to the failure of the flow controlling valve, introducing heat to Reboiler B. The propane 
mixture was continuously heated, leading to overpressure. Unfortunately, the gate valves 
failed, isolating Reboiler B from the overpressure protection system. Reboiler B finally 
ruptured, causing BLEVE and then a fireball, killing two workers nearby, because of the 
failure of the immediate ignition barrier, sprinkler and alarm. This diagnostic analysis 
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matches CSB (2016).  
Specifically, the updated occurrence probabilities of root nodes are presented in Table 3.13 
by conducting backward propagation. It is shown that the main contributing factors are 
Gate valves leaked and Gate valves mistakenly opened, whose posterior probabilities are 
more than 7 times as much as their prior probabilities. 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Diagnostic analysis of OE6. 
 
 Table 3.13 Updated probabilities of the nodes for OE6. 
Network node Symbol 
Prior 
probability (Pi) 
Posterior 
Probability (Pp) 
Ratio 
(Pp/Pi) 
Gate valves leaked  GVbL 0.012 0.089 7.46 
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Failure of quench water flow 
transmitter 
FT 0.113 0.148 1.31 
Failure of quench water flow 
controller 
FC 0.113 0.148 1.31 
Failure of quench water flow 
controlling valve 
FCV 0.699 0.916 1.31 
Failure of inlet gate valve due to 
plugging, choking, structural flaw 
IGVb 0.699 0.938 1.34 
Failure of outlet gate valve due to 
plugging, choking, structural flaw 
OGVb 0.699 0.938 1.34 
Failure of relief valve RV 0.113 0.207 1.83 
Gate valves mistakenly opened GVbO 0.125 0.923 7.39 
 
 Conclusions 
 
The proposed copula-based Bayesian network model is a robust risk assessment model that 
preserves the strength of BN and copulas in modelling conditional non-linear dependencies. 
BN is able to model the cause-effect relationships between components and copulas extend 
conditional dependence to stochastic dependence of higher-level complexity. Moreover, 
the application of BN makes it possible to make probability updating and dynamic 
probability estimations. Such a novel combination successfully overcomes the limitations 
of using either the traditional BN model alone or copulas with other quantitative risk 
analysis approaches. 
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The proposed model is tested on a real case study. The results of the proposed model are 
compared with the results of a traditional BN. It is observed that the non-linear dependence 
modeled by copulas yields significant increases in outcome probabilities, which are closer 
to reality. This highlights the significance of dependence among causes on the occurrence 
of undesired events. Moreover, this case study proves that the CBBN model is innovative 
and scientifically viable to be implemented to industry.  
The proposed revised model illustrates the use of copulas in a very simple and easy to 
implement way. It captures the inherently complex dependencies of process variables, e.g., 
common failure modes. Sensitivity analysis presents the crucial factors that affect the 
accident scenario. A diagnostic analysis is also performed, showing the most likely the 
causes of the BLEVE and propane release. Results confirm the effectiveness of this model. 
Results confirm the advantage of this model against other similar approaches. 
The proposed model needs further tests to ensure its wider applicability. This work can also 
be improved by considering advanced algorithms for data processing and estimating 
correlation parameters.   
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Chapter 4. Summary 
 
 
Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) currently plays an important role in risk assessment and 
safety management throughout the life cycle of process installations. To lower risks in the 
earliest stage, QRA can be used in risk-based design, which focuses on inherent safety. 
However, QRA is more often performed in the installation phase, which is after the 
completion of the equipment layout and safety measures. In the Introduction and Overview 
section of this thesis, a review of several popular QRA techniques and their strengths and 
limitations is presented. As is explained, most existing QRA techniques, such as bow-tie, 
do not take dependent failures into account. Although the Bayesian network incorporates 
linear dependency into the risk analysis process, it cannot model non-linear dependency in 
complex process systems. 
To meet the need for the risk estimation of systems with complex dependencies, the thesis 
proposes revisions of two traditional QRA methods by integrating copula functions. One 
revised model is copula-based bow-tie (CBBT), which fits integrated systems where 
dependency exists. The other is copula-based Bayesian network (CBBN), which is 
considered more generally applicable than CBBT, since it captures both mutual and 
stochastic dependencies by combining BN and copula functions.  
 
4.1 Conclusions  
 
Both models have been applied to practical cases that occur in chemical installation sites. 
The causes and outcomes of accident scenarios are first identified. Monte Carlo simulations 
 83 
 
are then employed while running these two copula-based models to count the mean 
occurrence times of all the possible outcomes. These simulation results are compared with 
the calculated deterministic probabilities from traditional bow-tie or Bayesian network 
analysis. As is observed, the probabilities of severe outcome events, where all the safety 
barriers fail to function, are considerably larger in copula-based models. This observation 
shows the great influence of dependence among safety barriers on the occurrence of 
accidents. It is also shown that the ignorance of potential dependency might result in an 
underestimated risk. To reduce the risk caused by dependence effects, more independent 
safety barriers are recommended to be integrated into process systems, if possible.    
The proposed models demonstrate the use of copula in a simple and straightforward way. 
The stochastic and non-linear dependencies among process variables, such as common 
failure modes, are represented by means of copulas. Hence, these two copula-based models 
can be employed as useful approaches when performing the risk assessment of complex 
process systems with inherent dependencies. The specific conclusions for each model are 
presented separately in the following subsections. 
 
4.1.1 Development of copula-based bow-tie model 
 
By integrating the stochastic dependencies among causes and bow-tie analysis, a copula-
based bow-tie model (CBBT) is developed. This revised model is first tested to study the 
effect of dependence among initiating events on AND gates & OR gates. It has been proven 
that positive dependence will increase the probability of an AND gate while decreasing the 
probability of an OR gate. It also shows that as dependence is more significant, an AND 
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gate probability value becomes closer to the minimal initiating event probability. In 
contrast, the probability value of an OR gate tends to approach the maximal probability 
value of all the initiating events. These interesting findings highlight the importance of 
monitoring potential dependent initiating events that may cause abnormal conditions so as 
to prevent top events.   
 
4.1.2 Development of copula-based Bayesian network model 
 
This thesis proposes a copula-based Bayesian network model, which is a powerful tool for 
modeling cause-effect relationships and conditional and stochastic dependencies. This 
model is applied to a real-life case study about a disaster resulting from a reboiler rupture. 
Causal analysis is performed and presented in the form of a Bayesian network. Simulation 
results indicate that some dependent failures should be blamed for causing the BLEVE and 
propane release, which match what occurred in reality. Sensitivity analysis identifies the 
safety systems that need more inspection and maintenance.  
 
4.2 Future work 
 
The two models may be examined by a broader scope of contexts beyond chemical 
processing industries to increase their applicability. Also, one of the limitations of the 
present research is that when determining failure probabilities, expert opinions rather than 
historical records are used. If sufficient on-site failure data become available, the proposed 
methodologies will be more useful. Whether or not there are dependencies should first be 
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analyzed. Subsequently, if dependencies do exist, advanced algorithms for processing data 
to estimate correlation parameters and model such dependencies should be further explored. 
Last, the incorporation of accident precursors to allow dynamic updates of the estimated 
probabilities in these copula-based models is an interesting subject for future research. 
 
